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CIVIL PROCEDURE-SUBROGATION-Subrogated Insurer's
Joinder in Action Against Third-Party Tortfeasor May Not Be Dis-
closed to Jury: Safeco Insurance Company ofAmerica v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Safeco Insurance Company of America v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that when a
subrogated insurer2 is required to join an action as a party and a jury tries
the case, the insurer's joinder may not be disclosed to the jury.3 This new
1. 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d 816 (1984).
2. Subrogation is the insurer's right to take the position of the insured in order to pursue recovery
from third parties legally responsible to the insured for a loss paid by the insurer. 16 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D § 61:1 (rev. ed. 1983) (citing Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Auto
Spring Supply Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 860, 131 Cal. Rptr. 211 (Cal. App. 1976)). "Subrogation may
exist by virtue of statute, judicial device, or agreement between the insured and the insurer and is
designed to compel discharge of the obligation by the one who in equity should bear the loss." Id.
(quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Gilchrist Bros., Inc., 85 N.J. 550, 428 A.2d 1254 (1981)). See also 44
Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance § 1794 (1982). Safeco involved legal subrogation arising by operation of
law. 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817. See also 16 G. Couch, supra §61:2. For a discussion of
conventional subrogation, or that which arises by contract of the parties, see infra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation R. Ins. Co., 78 N.M.
359, 363, 431 P.2d 737, 741 (1967).
3. Safeco, 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818. N.M. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides, in pertinent part,
that "[elvery action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest .. " Status as a
"real party in interest" is determined by whether one is the owner of the right being enforced and
is in a position to discharge the defendant from the liability asserted in the suit. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation R. Ins. Co., 78 N.M. 359, 364, 431 P.2d 737, 472 (1967).
N.M.R. Civ. P. 17(a) must be read together with rule 19(a). Prager v. Prager, 80 N.M. 773, 461
P.2d 906 (1969). N.M.R. Civ. P. 19(a) reads, in pertinent part:
Persons to be joined if feasible. A person . . . shall be joined . . . if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (A) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest, or (B) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise in-
consistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
See also N.M.R. Civ. P. 19(b), which reads, in pertinent part:
Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indis-
pensable....
The New Mexico judiciary has consistently held that a necessary party is also indispensable and,
therefore, must be joined or the case must be dismissed. See Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391,
310 P.2d 1045 (1957). Where an insurer has paid its insured for loss, in whole or in part, it is a
necessary and indispensable party to an action to recover amounts paid from the third party allegedly
responsible therefor. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Raton Natural Gas Co., 86 N.M. 741,
743, 410 P.2d 959, 961 (1966).
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procedure is intended to prevent jury prejudice4 against insured parties
while protecting the subrogated insurer's interests.' Even though the in-
surer is joined, the insured party must assert his claim solely against the
alleged tortfeasor for all damages, including any subrogated interest claimed
by the insurer.6 The insurer is permitted to prove its claim to the court
only after the insured has recovered.' The court will then apportion dam-
ages according to the respective interests of the insurer and insured8
This Note will demonstrate that the court did not achieve its goal of
adequately protecting subrogated rights. In addition, it questions the wis-
dom of a rule intended to apply in all situations involving subrogated
insurers.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Safeco involved an automobile accident among three parties, two in-
sured and one uninsured.' After paying the bulk of its insured's damages,
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G) brought suit under
a subrogation theory against both the uninsured and insured tortfeasors,
naming the insured tortfeasor's insurance company, Safeco, as a co-
defendant."0 USF&G also named its insured as an involuntary plaintiff
to the extent of her $100 deductable." Safeco moved to dismiss the claim
against it, alleging that, as a matter of law, USF&G and USF&G's insured
had no direct cause of action against Safeco. 2 The district court dismissed
the claim against Safeco. 3 USF&G appealed. 4
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that due
process required Safeco's joinder as a party defendant. 5 Relying on prior
4. The disclosure of insurance coverage is considered prejudicial. See infra note 27 and accom-
panying text. See also Falkner v. Martin, 74 N.M. 159, 162, 391 P.2d 660, 662 (1964). In Safeco,
Justice Walters discussed the potential for juror awareness of a party's insurance coverage through
the application of N.M.R. EVD. 101, 105, 401, 402, 411, and 1101. 101 N.M. at 150-52, 679
P.2d at 818-20. A complete discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this Note.
5. Safeco, .101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
6. Id. at 149-51, 679 P.2d at 817-19.
7. Id. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817. The three parties involved were Kim Taylor, insured by USF&G;
Nicholas Calomino, insured by Safeco; and Richard Vigil, the driver of a car owned by Eugene
Vigil, both uninsured.
10. Id.
11. Id. See N.M.R. Civ. P. 19(a) which provides, in pertinent part: "If he should join as a
plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary
plaintiff."
12. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 22 N.M. St.
B. Bull. 62, 63 (Ct. App. 1982).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The court reasoned that the rights of the parties were balanced, as required by principles
of due process, only when both insurers were named as parties to the action.
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New Mexico Supreme Court decisions, the court held that (1) USF&G
and its insured were indispensible parties required to join the action and
(2) since the plaintiff's insurance company was required to join as a
plaintiff, the element of fairness embodied in due process required that
the defendant's insurance company, Safeco, be joined as a party defend-
ant. 16
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the ex-
isting law regarding joinder of insurance companies as parties.' 7 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the joinder of
a subrogated insurer may not be disclosed to the jury. 8 To the extent that
any prior case law conflicted with this decision, the court also reversed
it. t9
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The New Mexico Supreme Court's Reasoning
In New Mexico, an insurer who pays its insured's claim pursuant to
policy terms is subrogated, by operation of law, to its insured's claim
against the third-party tortfeasor.2° Both insured and insurer, therefore,
are entitled to pursue recovery from the third-party tortfeasor.2'
One guiding purpose behind the Safeco court's decision was to protect
both individual and collective interests by promulgating rules intended
to apply in all insurance related situations. The Safeco court recognized
that New Mexico law had evolved as an attempt to ensure fairness to
16. Id. at 64. The court relied on Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957),
which held that a subrogated insurer was both a necessary and indispensable party to any action for
recovery on account of damage suffered by its insured. In Sellman, the plaintiff's insurer paid for
most of the damages the plaintiff suffered in an automobile accident. Id. at 403, 310 P.2d at 1053.
The trial court awarded the plaintiff the amount of his deductible only. Id. The plaintiff appealed.
Id. On appeal the defendant argued that plaintiff's subrogated insurance carrier was an indispensable
party to the suit. The court determined that there was only one cause of action based upon the claim
of defendant's negligence. Id. Accordingly, the court agreed that both insured and insurer must join
in the one action for recovery. Id. The Safeco court thea relied on Maurer v. Thorpe, 95 N.M. 286,
621 P.2d 503 (1980), which held that since the plaintiff's subrogated insurer was required to join
the suit according to the rule in Sellman, the plaintiff was denied due process of law if the defendant
failed to join his insurer. Maurer involved an automobile accident where both plaintiff and defendant
were insured. Id. at 287, 621 P.2d at 604. At trial the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to join the
defendant's insurer as a party-defendant. Id. at 288, 621 P.2d at 505. On appeal, the New Mexico
Supreme Court concluded that there was a "real probability that prejudice [would] result from
excluding defendant['s] insurer" in a case where the plaintiff was required to join its insurer. Id. In
the interests of fairness, the court determined that "the rights of the parties [were] balanced and
protected only when both insurance companies [were] named as parties to the action." Id.
17. Safeco, 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
18. Id. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817. See also supra note 2.
21. 16 G. COUCH, supra note 2, at section 61:1.
22. 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
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both individuals and insurance companies in particular fact situations. 3
Prior to Safeco, as the court of appeals correctly recognized, the New
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that a subrogated insurer to an injured party
was both a necessary and an indispensable party in an action brought by
that injured party against the alleged tortfeasor in a jury trial.24
This required only the joinder of plaintiff's insurer.25 Accordingly, it
created the risk of suggesting to the jury that a plaintiff was protected by
insurance while a defendant was not.26 Thus, in order to avoid potential
jury bias in favor of the apparently "financially unequal" defendant, the
New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the defendant's in-
surance company must also be joined.27 A direct action against the de-
fendant's insurer, however, was still prohibited.28
In Safeco, the New Mexico Supreme Court confronted a situation where
the earlier decisions were not effective.29 Safeco involved one insured
plaintiff, one insured defendant, and one uninsured defendant.3" Existing
legal doctrine mandated that the insurance companies be revealed to the
jury.3 The insured parties argued that a jury would be biased in favor of
23. Id. at 149-50, 679 P.2d at 817-18.
24. Sellman, 62 N.M. at 403, 310 P.2d at 1053. N.M.R. Civ. P. 19 requires joinder of all parties
to assure that the issues at bar are fully litigated and finally resolved. See supra note 3 and accom-
panying text.
25. Safeco, 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
26. See id. Courts have generally declared a mistrial when the awareness of insurance coverage
was thought to influence the verdict of the jury. Falkner, 74 N.M. at 162, 391 P.2d at 662.
27. Maurer, 95 N.M. at 287, 621 P.2d at 504. The plaintiff in Maurer argued that such a practice
violated concepts of due process of law viewing the probability of jury prejudice as fundamentally
unfair. Id. at 288, 621 P.2d at 505. The court held that in order to avoid biased verdicts against a
presumably "deep-pocket" plaintiff, the fairness principles of due process required that the defend-
ant's insurer join the action for the purpose of making its presence known to the jury. Id. See U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, and N.M. Const. art. IV. See also Campbell v. Benson, 97 N.M. 147, 637
P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1981). In Campbell, the court explained that when defendant's insurer is joined
as a party-defendant, its position is that of a nominal or pro forma party. Id. at 150, 637 P.2d at
581. "A nominal party . . . is one who, although joined as a party defendant, has no real interest
in the subject matter . . . and is joined merely because the technical rules of pleading require its
presence in the record." Id.
28. See Roberts v. Sparks, 99 N.M. 152, 154, 655 P.2d 539, 541. The liability of the defendant's
insurer depends upon the coverage under the defendant's policy; there is no relationship to the
plaintiff's cause of action. Id. See also Maurer, 95 N.M. at 287, 621 P.2d at 504. The decision in
Maurer served a dual purpose. First, it continued to protect the defendant from multiple litigation
by requiring joinder of plaintiff's insurer as a necessary and indispensible party. Id. Second, it created
financial equality in the eyes of the jury, by linking both plaintiff and defendant to their respective
insurer. id. In Campbell, 97 N.M. at 150, 637 P.2d at 581, the court said "the failure of a plaintiff
to initially join as an indispensable party its insurance carrier where plaintiff has been paid for losses
covered under a policy of insurance and a signed subrogation agreement is jurisdictional." Id. To
ensure fairness, the case must be dismissed if the insurer is not joined. Id.
29. See 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
30. Id.
31. Id. The court stated that applying the existing joinder doctrine to the facts of Safeco, requiring
disclosure of defendant's and plaintiff's insurers, would create the impression that the parties were
financially unequal, or that the insured parties had access to deep pockets. Id.
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the uninsured defendant, thus rendering a verdict favoring that uninsured
defendant. 32
The New Mexico Supreme Court, recognizing the potentially unfairjury bias, held that the plaintiff's subrogated insurer, while a necessary
and indispensable party, could not be revealed to the jury.33 Since the
invisibility of the plaintiff's insurance company negated the fairness ra-
tionale for requiring that the defendant's insurance company be named
in the action, the court also overruled its earlier requirement that a de-
fendant's insurance company be named in the action. 4 In so doing, the
court precluded any knowledge on the part of the jury of any party's
insurance situation."
The court reasoned that if the plaintiff's insurer is not disclosed to the
jury, then due process does not require joinder of defendant's insurer for
purposes of symmetry.36 By completely eliminating any jury awareness
of any party's insurance status, the Safeco court sought to eliminate
unfairness resulting from prejudice against insured parties.37 Moreover,
the Safeco decision protects the insurer's subrogation rights by permitting
the insurer to prove its claim after a verdict is rendered.3" Because the
Safeco court sought to prevent jury bias, the Safeco nondisclosure rule
is only applicable when a subrogated insurer is required to join a jury
trial.39
B. Problems With the Nondisclosure of Joinder Rule
In Safeco, the court intended to "obviate any unfair effects," '  by
requiring that the insurer's joinder not be disclosed.4 The court, therefore,
developed a rule overriding all prior practice involving subrogated in-
surers. 42
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
35. Id.
36. Id. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
37. See Safeco, 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
38. See id.
39. Id. If trial is not by jury there is obviously no need to protect the parties from potential jury
prejudice. Id. The Safeco court also noted that this procedure "has, as a practical matter been the
manner of proceeding that has been followed by agreement of the parties in many districts of New
Mexico for decades." Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. "Trial courts are instructed to disregard Sellman, Maurer, and Campbell as authority for
any joinder issues concerning insurers or insureds." Id.
42. Id. Compare Sellman, 62 N.M. at 403, 310 P.2d at 1053 (subrogated insurers are necessary,
and thus indispensable parties pursuant to N.M.R. Civ. P. 19); and Maurer, 95 N.M. at 288, 621
P. 2d at 505 (a plaintiff compelled by law to join its insurer is prejudiced in presenting his case unless
allowed to name the defendant's insurer as a party-defendant), with Safeco, 101 N.M. at 150, 679
P.2d at 818 (the fact of any subrogated insurer's joinder cannot be disclosed to the jury, therefore,
defendant need not join his insurer).
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The Safeco rule will not protect the interests of all parties in every
situation. First, the decision prevents the insurance company from par-
ticipating at trial in any manner that would disclose its joinder and status
as a party to the jury.43 If the insured initiates the cause of action and the
insured's lawyer fails to fully protect the joined insurer's rights, the
insurer may not be adequately protected." Second, when the plaintiff is
satisfied with his recovery under the policy provided by his insurer, he
may have no desire to bring action against the third-party tortfeasor.45 It
is unnecessary for the insurer to remain anonymous, while compelling
its insured to participate, when only the insurer is interested in the jury's
verdict.'
1. The Insurer's Inability to Control the Litigation
Whether the insurance company will be able to control the litigation
depends on the terms of the insurance policy itself. Often policies specify
the roles required of insured and insurer in any ensuing litigation.47 For
43. Compare Maurer, 95 N.M. at 287-88, 621 P.2d at 504-05 (stating that "[tihe Sellman rule
allows [the plaintiff's] insurance company to participate fully in the litigation, thereby protecting its
own interest[s] in recovering from the defendant .. ") with Safeco, 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d
at 818 (suggesting that an insurer will not be able to fully participate in litigation).
44. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Haney, 94 N.M. 335, 610 P.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1980). lnMaldonado,
the plaintiff-insured sought to avoid sharing its verdict with its subrogated insurance company. Id.
at 336, 610 P.2d at 223. The court, by stipulation prior to trial, assured the insurer, plaintiff-in-
intervention, that its subrogation rights would be protected by court order. id. Under Safeco, the
subrogated insurer is entitled to prove its subrogation claim only after its insured recovers damages.
101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818. There is a risk then that the insured will not recover an amount
reflective of all damages incurred by both insured and insurer. Unlike Maldonado, the insurer is not
protected by court stipulation which effectively puts the insured on notice of all interests that need
protection. See Maldonado, 94 N.M. at 336-37, 610 P.2d at 223-24.
45. See Safeco, 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817. In such situations the insurer must join its
insured as an involuntary plaintiff. Id. See also supra note 11, discussing the involuntary plaintiff
rule.
46. See Safeco, 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d 816 (where insured's interest was only $100, presumably
not sufficient incentive to facilitate the litigation).
47. See sample insurance forms infra. Many insurance policies include a clause providing for
subrogation. Quite often, howwever, these clauses are stated in general and ambiguous terms. For
example, a standard USF&G form contains the following provision:
If we make a payment under this policy and the person from whom payment was
made recovers damages from another, that person shall do: (1) whatever is nec-
essary to enable us to exercise our rights; and (2) nothing after loss to prejudice
them.
USF&G Form 00 01 (Ed. 6-80f).
A standard Safeco form likewise reads:
Trust Agreement. In the event of payment to any person under this endorsement:
(a) The company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds
of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible
for the bodily injury or property damage because of which such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of
recovery which he shall have against such other person or organization because
of the damages which are the subject of claim made under this endorsement; (c)
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example, an insured may have the duty either to sue the third-party
tortfeasor or to waive any right to collect from the insurer.48 The insurer
might have the right to bring the cause of action in the insured's name
and with the insured's participation but under the guidance and control
of the insurer.49 When a contract provides for such procedures, the contract
clearly prevails.5 °
Under these circumstances, the extent of both the insurer's and the
insured's rights are well defined. Yet, insurance policies are often stated
in general terms.5 Some policies require an insured to do "[w]hatever
is necessary" or "[w]hatever is proper," without specifying the insured's
duties, to protect its insurer's right of subrogation. 2 When the contract
is ambiguous, the Safeco nondisclosure rule necessarily limits the insur-
er's ability to control the litigation strategy. 3
Under Safeco if the insurer desires to bring suit against the third-party
tortfeasor, it is the insured that must assert the claim before the jury for
an amount which includes that to which his insurer is subrogated.54 More-
over, while the insurer must join any action brought by an insured, it
may not participate in the litigation in a manner that would disclose itsjoinder.5 If, for example, the insured's attorney inadequately demon-
strates damages, the insurer will be unable to intercede in a manner which
discloses its interests as a party. 6 This inability to fully disclose will
impair the insurer in protecting its subrogated interests.57
The Safeco court intended to "safeguard the interests of all insurers to
the extent of their subrogated rights.""8 If an insured maintains its suit
in an imcompetent fashion, the insurer should be allowed to reveal its
party status and participate openly and actively in the prosecution of the
such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing after loss
to prejudice such rights; (d) if requested in writing by the company, such person
shall take, through any representative designated by the company, such action as
may be necessary or appropriate to recover such payment as damages from such
other person or organization, such action to be taken in the name of such person;
in the event of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery
for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith ...
Safeco Form SA-383 R3 4/80.
48. See supra note 47.
49. Id.
50. 16 G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 61:3.
51. See supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. See Safeco, 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Maldonado, 94 N.M. at 335, 610 P.2d at 222.
57. But cf. Maldonado, 94 N.M. at 335, 610 P.2d at 222, where the insurer by stipulation was
fully protected. Absent this stipulation, the insurer protects itself by full participation. See also
Maurer, 95 N.M. at 287, 621 P.2d at 504, where the court recognized insurance company support
of the Sellman rule allowing participation.
58. 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
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cause. One solution to this problem is to allow disclosure and participation
whenever subrogation rights would otherwise be impaired. The court, in
its inherent power to manage the trial fairly, should have the power to
permit full disclosure and active participation as fairness requires. 9
Accordingly, if the court determines that the need for anonymity out-
weighs the insurer's need to control the trial, then the court should have
the power to decide that the nondisclosure rule stands. Whatever the
decision, courts should resolve the question of disclosure on a case-by-
case basis. The trial procedure should start with a presumption of non-
disclosure, but allow for disclosure when necessary.
2. Applicability of the Rule When the Insured Choses Not to Sue
Another problem arises when the insured does not initiate the cause
of action, perhaps because the insured is satisfied with his recovery under
the policy.6 Pursuant to the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, the
insurer is allowed to bring suit in the name of its insured, naming the
insured as an involuntary plaintiff.6 ' Presumably, an involuntary plaintiff
lacks motivation to prosecute the claim vigorously. In situations where
only the insurer's interests are at risk, nondisclosure may defeat the
purpose it is intended to serve. Moreover, the Safeco rule seeks to protect
insured plaintiffs and defendants from jury prejudice .62 If only the insurer
is seeking recovery, the Safeco's nondisclosure rule is unnecessary. The
court is protecting a party with no interest in the outcome of the suit.63
As it now stands, Safeco forbids disclosure of insurance coverage
irrespective of whether an insured needs such protection. A better rule
would permit disclosure when: (1) the insured's interests would not be
impaired, or (2) when protection of the insurer's interest requires such
disclosure.
Considering the problems inherent in the Safeco rule, lawyers and
insurance companies should carefully analyze whether the right to par-
ticipate fully in the court is desirable in a specific case prior to initiating
59. Compare Cooper v. Albuquerque City Commission, 85 N.M. 786, 790, 518 P.2d 275, 279
(1974) (protecting parties from adverse affects is a valid reason for not following the general rule
that an attempt to intervene after a final judgment should fail); Richins v. Mayfield, 85 N.M. 578,
580, 514 P.2d 854, 856 (1973) (trial judges may permit intervention after a final judgment, not-
withstanding the general rule that it not be allowed, if the judge finds that a right or interest cannot
otherwise be protected except by intervention).
60. See Safeco, 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
61. Id. See N.M.R. Civ. P. 19, quoted in pertinent parl, supra note 3. Safeco did not change
the application of this rule.
62. 101 N.M. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818.
63. See id. at 101 N.M. at 152-53, 679 P.2d at 820-21 (Justice Stowers stated, in his dissent
in Safeco "[wihile the majority properly concludes that an insurance company may be the real party
in interest . . . this opinion still proceeds to maintain the fiction that the insured is the real party in
interest in order to protect insurance companies from allegedly oversympathetic juries." Id.
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a trial. If so, disclosure of insurance coverage is necessary. The insurance
company has several options. The insurer could initiate suit and hope
that none of the parties demands a jury.' If trial is by jury and the insurer
has sufficient control of the litigation, the insurer could map out a strategy
involving the use of evidentiary rules that allow for disclosure of insurance
status.65 Certainly, the insurer's attorney could argue for a more flexible
rule which allows the trial court discretion to permit disclosure.6
IV. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court attempted in Safeco to resolve the
problems created by previous case law. The court in Safeco sought to
maintain the subrogated insurer's status as a necessary and indispensible
party and eliminate possible jury prejudice as well as safeguarding sub-
rogated rights. It is likely that the Safeco rule cannot fully achieve all of
these goals in all possible situations. It would, therefore, be fairer and
more efficient to permit trial courts to exercise their discretion in deter-
mining when disclosure is desirable.
JAMES LAWRENCE SANCHEZ
64. Id. at 150, 679 P.2d at 818 (the Safeco rule only applies to trial by jury).
65. See generally Safeco, 101 N.M. at 150-52, 679 P.2d at 818-20 (Justice Walters' discussion
on the applicable rules of evidence).
66. Since this argument runs contra to Safeco, the attorney's ultimate success may only arise on
appeal.
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